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Liquidity shortages arise when ﬁ  nancial institutions and industrial companies scramble for, and cannot 
ﬁ  nd the cash they require to meet their most urgent needs or undertake their most valuable projects. 
Liquidity problems are compounded when some actors do have excess liquidity, but are unwilling to lend 
it at the maturities desired by prospective borrowers. The paper revisits the theoretical underpinnings
of such liquidity shortages: what drives corporate liquidity demand and supply? How is the latter affected 
by ﬁ  nancial innovation? When does the economy produce enough liquidity for its own needs, and what is 
the role of public policy? The paper also offers some comments on the recent subprime episode and its 
implications for prudential regulation, rating agencies and public policy.ARTICLES
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L
ong before the early-August injections
of hundreds of billions of dollars of liquidity 
by the Fed and the ECB, and ever since, 
central banks and governments have pondered 
over how and when to stabilize troubled credit 
markets. Liquidity is potentially scarce, as 
actors contemplate the prospect of ﬁ  re  sales
of mortgage-backed assets, and to boot it all, actors 
with available liquidity refrain from lending it 
to those who are short of it. The USD 11 billion 
Citigroup write-down of mortgage-related assets 
and other similar developments at the time 
of this writing (early November) have raised 
questions about the effectiveness and timing of the
US Treasury backed USD 75 billion “superfund”
plan of three large American banks1 to purchase 
assets from distressed investments in order to 
prevent ﬁ  re sales.
But what is “liquidity”? Does liquidity matter 
and should governments and central banks do 
something about it? While trivial to a practionner, 
these questions surprisingly are not so obvious to 
an economist trained in the general-equilibrium 
tradition. Intuitively, an industrial company or 
ﬁ  nancial institution is short of liquidity when a) some 
(continuation or investment) spending decisions 
are worthwhile, and b) the ﬁ  rm somehow cannot 
manage to ﬁ  nd the money to ﬁ  nance them. Classical 
(Arrow-Debreu, Modigliani-Miller) economic theory 
holds it that a) and b) are inconsistent: if reﬁ  nancing 
or ﬁ  nancing of new projects is desirable, so goes 
the argument, the ﬁ  rm can always issue claims on 
associated future proﬁ  ts, that investors will ﬁ  nd 
sufﬁ  ciently attractive to be willing to ﬁ  nance the 
outlay. According to this logic, ﬁ  rms have no reason 
to plan their liquidity (or for that matter to engage 
in risk management to avoid bad surprises in their 
liquidity position): they just can return to the capital 
market as needs arise.
This paper offers a conceptual framework in which 
to couch the debate about the recent subprime 
crisis,2 and uses this framework to illustrate some 
of the relevant issues. This conceptual framework 
at the microeconomic level builds on the existence 
of agency costs and the concomitant difﬁ  culty for 
ﬁ  rms to access funds (section 1). Costly reﬁ  nancing 
leads to a demand for liquidity, with a range of 
familiar corollaries such as risk and asset-liability 
management. On the supply side, liquidity is created 
in several ways: inside liquidity is provided by the 
ﬁ  rms themselves by issuing securities “backed” 
by the ﬁ   rm’s future income. Outside liquidity 
stems from the consumer sector, the State, and the 
international market.
Section 2 ﬁ  rst explains why liquidity may be scarce 
and shows how assets such as Treasury securities 
command liquidity premia by serving as stores 
of value. It also discusses the interaction among 
bubbles, liquidity and investment.
Section 3 draws the implications for public policy.
1| LIQUIDITY:
  DEMAND AND SUPPLY
An unfortunate habit of economists is the use of the 
same word, “liquidity”, to cover distinct concepts. 
Consider the common deﬁ  nition: “An asset is liquid 
if its owner can resell it quickly at a decent price”. 
This deﬁ  nition already recoups the two main and 
distinct interpretations of the concept:
“Market microstructure or microeconomic liquidity” 
understanding: an asset is liquid if the transaction 
costs of buying and selling the asset are small; for 
example:
“The degree of liquidity of a market is traditionally 
assessed on the basis of three essential criteria: the 
tightness of the bid-ask spread, which is a direct measure 
of transaction costs (excluding other operational costs), 
and two other criteria that indicate the market’s ability 
to absorb signiﬁ  cant volumes without adverse effects on 
prices : market depth, which corresponds to the volume
of transactions that may be immediately executed without 
slippage of best limit prices, and market resilience,
i.e. the speed with which prices revert to their equilibrium 
level following a random shock in the transaction ﬂ  ow.” 
(Bervas, 2006).
In particular, assets with low bid-ask spreads 
(due to low transaction costs or small amounts of 
informational asymmetries) are liquid according to 
this deﬁ  nition. The stock market index, an on-the-run 
1  Bank of America, Citigroup, and JPMorgan Chase.
2  The theoretical framework has been elaborated in collaboration with Bengt Holmström (See Holmström and Tirole 1998, 2000, 2001 and 2008).ARTICLES
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Treasury bond, or a mortgage-backed portfolio about 
which actors would be symmetrically informed, are 
equally “liquid” according to this deﬁ  nition.
“Aggregate or macroeconomic liquidity” understanding: 
according to this alternative deﬁ  nition, variants of 
which date back to Keynes and Hicks, an asset offers 
liquidity to the corporate world if it can be used by 
the latter as a cushion to address pressing needs. To 
be an effective cushion, though, the asset must not 
lose value in those very circumstances in which the 
corporate sector does need money. In this respect, 
the on-the-run Treasury bond is rather distinct from 
the stock index or the hypothetical mortgage-backed 
portfolio in that it does not lose value in recessions,3 
while the latter’s value is likely to be reduced precisely 
in case of an industrial or ﬁ  nancial recession.
To analyze the subprime crisis, monetary policy 
and other public interventions geared to adjusting 
the existing liquidity, the relevant deﬁ  nition is the 
macroeconomic one, and we will therefore focus 
on it, even though we will note incidentally that 
macroeconomic illiquidity makes microeconomic 
illiquidity more likely.
The demand for liquidity
A basic feature of corporate ﬁ  nancial management 
is that revenues and outlays are not perfectly 
synchronized. The lack of synchronicity between 
cash ﬂ  ows and needs implies that ﬁ  rms and ﬁ  nancial 
institutions must ﬁ  nd ways of covering their needs 
in periods of shortfall. Two broad strategies are 
available to this purpose: “ﬁ  nance as you go” and 
“liquidity hoarding”.
“Finance as you go” consists in returning to the capital 
market and borrowing from investors and other 
corporations when needs arise. Note that markets 
would satisfactorily bridge the temporal gaps between 
revenues and expenditures in a world of perfect 
(understand “agency-cost free”) capital markets.
That strategy however has its limits as both the theory 
of corporate ﬁ  nance and the daily observation of 
credit rationing suggest. Due to moral hazard, adverse 
selection (asymmetries of information about assets 
in place and projects), or mere transaction costs
(we will regroup these three factors under the heading 
of “ﬁ  nancial market imperfections”), cash-strapped 
corporations ﬁ  nd it hard to ﬁ  nd ﬁ  nancing even 
for positive net-present-value actions. The current 
subprime crisis is a case in point: the lending to the 
ECB rather than to cash-strapped banks by banks 
with excess liquidity, the stalling of the collateralised 
debt obligation (CDO) market, the corporate credit 
spread, and the overall credit crunch despite the 
injection of liquidity by central banks all illustrate 
the difﬁ  culty of relying on markets for reﬁ  nancing.
For this reason, corporations must complement the 
recourse to the ﬁ  nancial market by some planning of 
their own. That is, they must hoard liquidity either 
directly (by holding securities on their own books) 
or indirectly (by securing an explicit or implicit 
credit line from a bank, an insurance company, or 
a parent company, which hold securities on their 
own balance sheets to back these lines of credit).
For future reference, we will call inside liquidity the 
amount that can be raised by the corporate sector 
simply by issuing new claims on its future income. 
This amount depends on the economic environment; 
for example, improved corporate governance assuages 
investors’ concern about the prospect of recouping 
the money they invested; in economic jargon, better 
corporate governance increases the pledgeability of 
ﬁ  rm resources to investors. Thus, better corporate 
governance institutions facilate reﬁ  nancing by the 
corporate sector and thereby inside liquidity.
Another strategy for ﬁ  rms to raise money from the 
capital market is to securitize a portfolio of loans 
that it has issued. Indeed securitization, often 
described as an unloading of risk to other parties, 
is also about the certiﬁ  cation of the quality of past 
activities; indeed asymmetric information about 
the real value of the returns streams attached 
to the loans makes it difﬁ  cult to offer the loan 
portfolio as collateral against further borrowing. 
The securitization process, if it is accompanied by 
careful scrutiny by buyers, rating agencies or credit 
enhancers, certiﬁ  es the quality of the portfolio to 
the market and transforms otherwise illiquid assets 
into tradable ones.4 If properly performed (i.e. with 
3  In a ﬁ  rst approximation. Of course, swings in the interest rate affect the value of longer-term bonds. Let’s skip the corresponding discussion here, as it would bring 
us to a discussion of asset-liability management.
4  The securization process is very similar to the exit mechanism in venture capital deals. This exit mechanism enables the venture capitalist to mobilize illiquid 
capital (part or all of his/her share in the venture), certify it through an initial public offering or a sale to a knowledgeable buyer, and thereby avail himself/herself
of new funds to undertake new deals.ARTICLES
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the right incentives in place), this process thereby 
boosts the volume of inside liquidity.
A key question that will be discussed later on is 
whether in the aggregate the corporate sector produces 
enough inside liquidity to cater for its own needs. 
If not, the corporate sector as a whole must hoard 
stores of value. But the hoarding of liquidity at the 
level of the corporate sector supposes the existence 
in the economy of “stores of value” or “reserves”
or outside liquidity. We will return shortly to this point 
when we discuss the supply of liquidity.
Finally, because we will be interested in 
macroeconomic aspects, we will not discuss the ﬁ  ne 
points of this liquidity management by individual 
corporations, although this would in its own sake 
be worthwhile. Let it sufﬁ  ce to say that liquidity 
management must adapt to the lack of coincidence 
between cash ﬂ  ows and needs across states of nature 
and across time: risk management aims at partially5 
insuring the ﬁ  rm’s liquidity position against insurable 
risks. Similarly, asset-liability management (ALM) 
techniques try to restore some coincidence between 
the timing of receipts and expenditures; thus, 
pension funds or life-insurance companies have 
higher demands for securities delivering coupons 
15 or 25 years ahead than banks do. Again, these 
standard functions of ﬁ  nancial ofﬁ  cers would be 
hard to rationalize in a classical economics world, 
in which ﬁ  rms could costlessly return to the capital 
market to raise funds when they need to.
The supply of liquidity
As we noted, liquidity management pre-supposes 
the existence of stores of value in the economy. Such 
outside liquidity in practice can be decomposed into 
ﬁ  ve categories depending on its origin:
￿ Rents created by past economic activities: past 
activities have created streams of future incomes 
that can be mobilized as stores of value. Some are 
directly traded in public or private equity markets
(Château d’Yquem); others are not (historical 
monuments and housing still owned by the State).
￿ State-provided liquidity: States supply liquidity to 
the corporate sector in various ways. First, they 
issue securities that can be used as stores of values. 
As usual, one must ask, what is it that the State 
can do that the private sector cannot do? These 
securities are backed by publicly owned assets, 
and, more interestingly, by the future tax revenue 
to be collected by the state. Indeed, we argue 
that the key to public provision of liquidity is the 
unique/monopoly ability of the State to access 
consumers’ future income through taxation: while 
consumers can directly provide corporations with 
credit lines that are unbacked by real assets only 
in limited amounts (due to the legal or contractual 
inability to pledge future income-the prohibition
of slavery),6 they can do so indirectly through the 
State: the future tax revenue is the collateral that 
backs the payment of interest and principal on 
Treasury securities. Second, and again using their 
regalian taxation power, States provide liquidity 
through various state-contingent injections, with 
varying implicit liabilities for taxpayers: repos, 
discount window, banking and industrial sector 
bailouts. But there are many less obvious ways in 
which States redistribute money from consumers to 
ﬁ  rms in bad times (and money the other way round 
in good times): non-indexed deposit insurance, whose 
rates don’t reﬂ  ect the enhanced probability of bank 
default during recessions; non-indexed payroll taxes 
ﬁ  nancing unemployment beneﬁ  ts, and so forth.
￿ Stores of value directly created by consumers: 
consumers however may directly create stores
of value when they borrow instead of ﬁ  nancing 
their homes themselves. Their commitment to 
reimburse interest and principal on their mortgages 
represents a claim on their future income; this claim 
can be securitized and transformed into a store of 
value through the institution of mortgage-backed
securities (MBSs).7 It is interesting to note in this 
respect that real estate mortgages of US households 
have grown from 15% of their net wealth in 1949 
to 41% in 2001, due to various factors (ﬁ  nancial 
innovation; increased risk taking through high
loan-to-value ratios, teaser rates and lack of 
reﬁ  nancing penalties; changes in legislation favoring 
5  The reader will ﬁ  nd in Tirole (2006, chapter 5) a review of the considerations that make full coverage of such risks suboptimal. It should be also noted that risk 
management does not aim at insuring investors as the latter can diversify their risks in other ways.
6  The main example of this is consumer credit (which incidentally is the object of securitization).
7  There are limits to the creation of liquidity in this manner, though. First, the consumers must consume some of the money they economize today by borrowing; 
otherwise they invest it into stores of value, and there is no net creation of such stores of value. Note, second, that future mortgage payments compete with taxes, 
especially if they are tax deductible; that may reduce the State’s ability to create liquidity.ARTICLES
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home ownership). An interesting empirical question 
relates to how much liquidity is really created 
through the dual process of mortgage borrowing and 
securitization. And more generally, it is to be seen 
how much additional liquidity can be harnessed 
through ﬁ   nancial innovation; the analysis here 
meets that of Hernando de Soto, who argued that 
the transformation of “dead capital” to “live capital” 
is a key step in the development process.8
￿ Foreign sources of liquidity: corporations can buy 
foreign stores of value: e.g. the stock index or 
Treasury securities of a foreign country. They can 
also access lines of credit from the international 
ﬁ  nancial community. The access to foreign stores 
of value and lines of credit is however limited as 
they have to be ﬁ  nanced in foreign currency, and 
so, like for sovereign States themselves, the ability 
to borrow is bounded by the export capacity of 
the country.9
The assertion that a country’s ability to borrow 
is limited by its capacity to export may seem 
strange in view of the recent American experience. 
However, the enormous amount of borrowing by 
the US is a case in point for a discussion of the role 
of pledgeability in facilitating ﬁ  nancing. Corporate 
governance, the importance of publicly-held 
corporations, the role of markets and securitization 
in creating liquid claims, and the political economy 
of the country (a strong support for investor 
protection, due in particular to the existence
of pension funds) all concur to create a substantial 
volume of liquidity, which is in high demand in 
countries producing substantial income, but few 
pledgeable claims.
￿ Bubbles: bubbles, by inﬂ  ating the value of ﬁ  nancial 
assets (stocks, real estate), inﬂ  ate the volume of stores 
of value. To be certain, bubbles only go so far to boost 
corporate liquidity if they tend to burst precisely 
when the economy enters or is in a recession.10
2| LIQUIDITY SHORTAGES
  AND LIQUIDITY PREMIA
2|1  The concept of inside liquidity
  in the aggregate
Let us start with a basic question, that of the 
sufﬁ  ciency of inside liquidity at the aggregate level. 
We have seen that in the presence of agency costs, 
the Arrow-Debreu and Modigliani-Miller feasibility 
of “ﬁ  nancing as you go” by resorting to the capital 
market does not hold at the individual ﬁ  rm level; 
because investors cannot grab the entire beneﬁ  ts 
associated with their investment, they tend to ration 
the ﬁ  nancing they extend to the ﬁ  rm. However, 
“ﬁ  nancing as you go” might hold “on average” at 
the  macroeconomic level, and so the corporate 
sector might not need outside stores of value to 
ﬁ  nance positive NPV re-investments. We therefore 
investigate the sufﬁ  ciency of inside liquidity in an 
example; the conclusions are very general.
An example: consider a representative entrepreneur 
and three dates (and no discounting between these 
three dates): t=0, 1, 2 (See ﬁ  gure below for a summary 
of the timing). At date 0, the entrepreneur has a 
project, for which she must invest 10, but she has 
wealth only equal to 8; she must therefore go to the 
capital market in order to ﬁ  nance this investment. 
The investment, if made at date 0, does not generate 
any revenue at date 1; actually with probability ½, an 
overrun (a “liquidity shock”) of 20 arises, that must 
be covered if the project is to go on and produce 
income at date 2, otherwise the project is liquidated 
and yields no income.11 At date 2, revenue accrues 
(provided that the overrun, if any, has been covered 
at date 1). The total proceeds, 30, are shared between 
investors and entrepreneur; namely, the pledgeable 
income, that is the maximum amount that can 
credibly be promised to investors, is only 12.12
8  De Soto provides the example of giving land ownership rights to land-occupying farmers; property rights give farmers the ability to borrow against this collateral 
and enable them to buy equipments or new seeds.
9  On this see Caballero-Krishnamurthy (2001 and 2003) and Holmström-Tirole (2002 and 2008).
10  The popping of the bubble actually triggers a recession. On this, see Farhi and Tirole (2008).
11  With probability ½, there is no overrun and therefore no extra expense at date 1.
12  For example, the 18 left to the entrepreneur might correspond to an incentive payment provided to the entrepreneur (or more generally the ﬁ  rm’s insiders) to curb 
moral hazard. That amount may also include the entrepreneur’s perks and prestige from ofﬁ  ce. Last, it could also represent money that is diverted toward other 
activities (afﬁ  liated companies, investment in human capital that will be operative in other, future activities).ARTICLES
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Note ﬁ  rst that ﬁ  nancing the project and covering the 
overrun if it arises is viable for the investors, even 
though they cannot put their hands on the entire 
pie: recalling that the interest rate is by assumption 
equal to 0, total (date 0 plus date 1) investor outlay 
is equal to date-2 revenue on investors’ claim on the 
ﬁ  rm: (10-8)+ (1/2) (20) = 12.
However, the “ﬁ  nance as you go” strategy is not 
sustainable: suppose that the entrepreneur borrows 2,
against claims on date-2 income, so as to just be 
able to cover the investment at date 0, and counts 
on returning to the capital market at date 1 in case 
of overrun. When the overrun arises, the capital 
market won’t be willing to supply more than the 
maximum revenue, 12, that investors can grab at 
date 2 (to obtain 12, a restructuring of claims through 
a renegotiation with initial claimholders –who 
obtain 0 if the ﬁ  rm goes bankrupt at date 1– is needed 
if new investors are brought in). Therefore investors 
aren’t willing to bring in the 20 that are necessary to 
withstand the liquidity shock faced by the ﬁ  rm.
The entrepreneur must therefore plan and hoard 
liquidity. In this simple example, there are various 
ways of doing so, but a “reasonable” one may go as 
follows: the ﬁ  rm contracts with a bank on a line of 
credit equal to 20. If this line is drawn, the bank 
becomes the senior creditor and therefore obtains 12 
at date 2. The bank in exchange demands at date 0 a 
commitment fee equal to 4 = (1/2) (20-12); it makes 
money if the credit line is not drawn, and loses 
money if the ﬁ  rm faces an overrun. This is indeed 
the nature of a credit line: there would be no reason 
to contract in advance on a credit line if at date 1 
the bank were always happy to provide the funds; 
it is precisely because lending is a money-losing 
operation at date 1 that it must be pre-arranged.
The other investors must bring in 2 (the investment 
cost minus the entrepreneur’s contribution to it) plus 
the commitment fee, so 6 in total. They are willing 
to do so, as they get back (1/2) (12) = 6.
This is all well, but we haven’t addressed the 
“macroeconomic question”: where will the bank ﬁ  nd 
the 20 that it has committed to bring in if the credit 
line is drawn? Imagine that there are lots of such 
entrepreneurs in this economy. Entrepreneurs are 
identical at date 0. As we observed, given that the
ﬁ   rm-idiosyncratic events of liquidity shocks are 
independent and so there is no  macroeconomic 
uncertainty, exactly half of the ﬁ  rms face an overrun.
The claim (which is entirely general, and so not 
speciﬁ  c to this very special example)13 is that the 
private sector produces enough inside liquidity 
to efﬁ  ciently withstand liquidity shocks that it 
should withstand; another way of rephrasing the 
same point is that if one introduces a store of value
(a Treasury bond, say) delivering 1 at date 1
(or 2, it does not matter), this store of value will 
trade at price 1 at date 0: it won’t embody any 
liquidity premium for supplying liquidity services, 
or equivalently, its interest rate will be equal to the 
economy wide rate (here 0): there is no risk-free 
rate puzzle.
To see this, let the banks invest the 4 they receive 
in commitment fees in ordinary claims on other 
ﬁ  rms. If banks are diversiﬁ  ed, the per-ﬁ  rm value 
of the resulting portfolio is (4/6) (1/2) (12) = 4 at 
date 1. To honor its credit line commitments, the 
bank needs (1/2) (20-12) = 4, so everything is in 
order. Note that this arrangement requires some 
prudential supervision: the bank in general would 
make more proﬁ  t by selecting subsets of ﬁ  rms for 
which liquidity shocks are correlated as this strategy 
guarantees large proﬁ  ts when such shocks do not 
arise, and otherwise does not expose the bank, which 
is protected by limited liability.14
0
Investment :  -10 
Equity :    8











13  See Holmström-Tirole (1998 and 2008). The key assumption for this proposition to hold is that the corporate sector be a net borrower.
14  With perfect correlation of shocks in its portfolio, the bank makes 8 per ﬁ  rm in the absence of overrun and 0 in case of overrun, instead of 0.ARTICLES
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There are other, apparently natural ways of hoarding 
liquidity that do not work, though. Imagine that 
instead of centralizing the liquidity within ﬁ  nancial 
intermediaries dispatching liquidity as needed, each 
ﬁ  rm hoards liquidity in a decentralized way. That 
is, each ﬁ  rm holds the representative portfolio or 
index. The value of this portfolio at date 1 is (1/2) 
(12) = 6, which is insufﬁ  cient to cover the liquidity 
shortfall (equal to 8) in the presence of an overrun. 
To be certain, the ﬁ  rms that do not face an overrun 
have excess liquidity: the value 6 of the security 
market holdings, not to mention the possibility of 
diluting existing claims on their pledgeable income. 
However, and this is the key point, they have no 
incentive to lend to and rescue the distressed ﬁ  rms; 
this situation is certainly reminiscent of the recent 
subprime crisis, in which those institutions with 
cash refuse to lend to those without. The efﬁ  cient 
outcome does not arise under decentralized liquidity 
hoarding. There is enough aggregate liquidity in 
principle, but it is wasted by allocating liquidity in 
a non-contingent manner, so that ﬁ  rms that end up 
not needing liquidity have plenty of it.
Matters are quite different in the presence of 
macroeconomic shocks. To take an extreme case, 
suppose that with probability ½ all entrepreneurs 
face a cost overrun simultaneously; that is, the 
liquidity shocks are perfectly correlated. Then there 
is no way investors are going to put in 20 per ﬁ  rm 
at date 1: their claims on date 2 income are only
12 per ﬁ  rm, and they cannot be forced to disgorge 20
even if their portfolios of claims on the ﬁ  rms are 
seized. Somehow for the efﬁ   cient allocation to 
be sustainable there must exist stores of values
in quantity at least equal to 8 per ﬁ  rm.
To sum up, meeting liquidity shocks in the absence 
of outside stores of value requires issuing new 
securities, i.e. digging into inside liquidity, along the 
way. There is a shortage of inside liquidity when the 
economy is hit by aggregate shocks. In the absence 
of macroeconomic shock, by contrast, the corporate 
sector as a whole in principle produces enough inside 
liquidity to meet liquidity shocks it wants to withstand, 
even though there is insufﬁ  cient inside liquidity at 
the ﬁ  rm level. We have stressed that the adequacy of 
inside liquidity in the aggregate hinges on an efﬁ  cient 
dispatching of available liquidity toward those ﬁ  rms 
in (moderate) need of cash. This is accomplished by 
pooling the available liquidity at the level of ﬁ  nancial 
intermediaries, who then redispatch the liquidity 
through a mechanism akin to credit lines; by contrast, 
self provision of liquidity, under which each ﬁ  rm 
hoards liquidity for its own purposes, leads to a waste 
and therefore a potential shortage of liquidity, as ﬁ  rms 
that end up awash with cash do not lend it to those 
with a shortage of liquidity.
Another source of illiquidity is the asymmetry of 
information about stores of value. This asymmetry of 
information about assets increases during recessions; 
for example, a portfolio of mortgage-backed 
securities may face little risk, and therefore generate 
little concern about its quality, in good times, and 
become riskier when things get worse; in the latter 
circumstances, the MBS assets become illiquid as 
participants in asset markets are asymmetrically 
informed: as we announced earlier, macroeconomic 
illiquidity may generate microeconomic illiquidity.
2|2  Liquidity premia and LAPM
Let us return to the example, in the presence of 
macroeconomic uncertainty. Note ﬁ  rst that holding 
the “stock index” (a portfolio of shares of the 
ﬁ  rms) does not bring any useful liquidity to ﬁ  rms 
or ﬁ  nancial intermediaries: in the simple-minded 
example given above, the value of this stock index 
falls to 0 when the economy is hit by a shock: all 
ﬁ  rms are then valueless. The stock index has value 
in the absence of shock, but this value serves no 
liquidity purpose as ﬁ  rms don’t need liquidity in 
this circumstances. Put differently, the stock index 
does not allow ﬁ  rms to diversify and create a store 
of value that can be resold in case of liquidity needs. 
Thus, the stock index is not a liquid security in the 
macroeconomic sense, even though it is perfectly 
liquid in the microeconomic sense.
Let us now add outside liquidity in a stylized 
manner to our example. Suppose that at date 0, 
there exist stores of value, in quantity x per ﬁ  rm, 
that the corporate world can purchase and use 
to meet liquidity needs at date 1. Namely, each 
store of value delivers 1 per ﬁ  rm at date 1.15 We 
will call these stores of value the “risk-free assets”, 
and the return they command the “risk-free rate”.
15  Or, indifferently here, at date 2: a long-term store of value delivering 1 at date 2 can be resold at date 1 to consumers at price 1 as consumers are assumed not to 
discount the future (the rate of interest is equal to 0).ARTICLES
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If x is greater than 8, the shortage of liquidity, then 
outside liquidity makes up for this shortage. There is 
sufﬁ  cient aggregate liquidity: ﬁ  rms can hoard x stores 
of value each; when they face a liquidity shock they 
can resell these x stores of value and supplement 
this sale through a sufﬁ   cient dilution of initial 
claimholders: for example, if x is equal to 14, then 
the ﬁ  rms can double the number of shares in each 
ﬁ  rm. In so doing, the ﬁ  rms raise cash (1/2) (12) = 6,
which together with the sale of the risk-free asset 
allow them to cover the cost overrun (20).16 
With lower amounts of outside liquidity, outside 
liquidity complements inside liquidity, but there is 
still a shortage. Firms compete for the scarce stores of 
value, raising their price above 1; put differently, the 
risk-free assets command a return that is below that 
suggested by the consumers’ rate of time preference 
(here normalized at 0). The higher x, the smaller the 
liquidity premium (the closer the interest rate is to 0).17
Like in the less formal accounts of Hicks and 
Keynes, risk-free securities are held not so much 
for their return, but rather because they deliver cash
when ﬁ   rms need it: they are liquid in the 
macroeconomic sense.
More generally, the price of assets reﬂ  ects how much 
liquidity they bring when it is needed. This property 
is very much in the spirit of the capital-asset-pricing
model (CAPM), which determines security values 
from the covariance of their return with aggregate 
activity. There is a difference, though: in the CAPM 
paradigm, pricing is determined entirely by the 
consumer sector (technically, the covariance refers to 
that between the asset’s return and the representative 
consumer’s marginal rate of substitution). The 
liquidity-asset-pricing model (LAPM) adds ﬁ  rms to 
the picture and states that corporate demand for stores 
of value also drives the pricing of assets. In the example 
above, the ﬁ  rms pay a premium over what consumers 
are willing to pay and so pricing is determined on the 
corporate side rather than on the consumer side.
In this simple minded example, ﬁ  rms hold all risk-free 
assets, at least if x is less than 8, because consumers 
have no liquidity needs of their own. More generally 
and realistically, the “pricing kernel” is determined 
jointly by consumers and ﬁ  rms with liquidity needs. 
The key message is therefore that one cannot ignore 
variations in corporate net liquidity demand when 
pricing assets.
The “model” described above can, at the cost of 
increased complexity, be used to study the dynamics 
of inside liquidity generation and the term structure 
of interest rates.18 Yesterday’s investments give rise 
to dividends tomorrow, which if traded, create stores 
of value today. This creates an investment hysteresis: 
a higher level of liquidity supports more investment, 
which in turn creates future dividends that if not 
transformed into dead capital will create liquidity 
tomorrow and support new investment, and so forth. 
The interest rate is procyclical, and the interest rate 
spread (long rate minus short rate) countercyclical.
2|3 Bubbles
An asset is said to embody a bubble if its price exceeds 
its fundamental value, namely the value of future 
dividends, coupons or rentals. It is by no means easy 
to disentangle bubbles from fundamentals when 
asset prices reach high levels. For example, the 
high real estate prices of the ﬁ  rst half of this decade
in the US can be attributed at least partly to 
fundamental-boosting low interest rates resulting 
from Alan Greenspan’s deliberate attempt to raise 
asset values. Shiller however argues that one can 
detect the existence of a real estate bubble by 
comparing the evolution of rental and ownership 
prices. Real estate prices moved in synchronicity with 
rental rates (the “dividends” on the real-estate assets) 
until 2000, and afterwards gained 70% relative to 
rental rates, suggesting the appearance of a bubble.
A policy debate has accordingly emerged, as to 
whether the central bank should try to prick, or at 
least lean against the bubble (assuming one succeeds 
in identifying one). For example, Bernanke (2002) 
and Bernanke-Gertler (2000 and 2001) argue that the 
central bank should not be concerned about a bubble 
unless it is a signal of incoming inﬂ  ation; others,
e.g. Bordo-Jeanne (2002) feel otherwise.
16  Note that the issue of liquidity waste does not arise here: with perfectly correlated shocks, as presumed in this example, a ﬁ  rm needs cash precisely when others 
also need cash; there is therefore no need to transfer cash from liquidity rich ﬁ  rms to ﬁ  rms with liquidity needs.
17  Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2007) show that the yield spread between AAA rated corporate bonds and US Treasury securities is low when the stock 
of debt is high, and this even if one controls for default risk on corporate bonds. As they state, changes in the supply of Treasury debt trace out the demand
for convenience by investors.
18  Ongoing work by Emmanuel Farhi and the author.ARTICLES
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The classic view of asset bubbles19 has it that a) the 
existence of a bubble raises interest rates, b) a bubble 
crowds out productive investment, and c) bubbles can 
exist only if the economy is “dynamically inefﬁ  cient”, 
i.e. only if the rate of interest lies below the rate of 
growth of the economy (the productive sector then 
absorbs more resources than it delivers). While the 
increase in interest rates is rather uncontroversial, 
the validity of the other two properties has been 
questioned. First, while the competition (or crowding 
out) effect is undeniably there as bubbles inﬂ  ate 
the volume of assets proposed to lenders, speciﬁ  c 
episodes (the Japanese or the American bubbles) 
suggest that asset bubbles may sometimes go hand 
in hand with sustained investment. Second, Abel, 
Mankiw, Summers and Zeckhauser (1989) have 
argued that there is no evidence that the economy 
is dynamically inefﬁ  cient.
 
In an economy with capital market imperfections, 
though, bubbles also add to the volume of stores
of value. Although they may burst precisely when the 
economy enters a recession, they still have a residual 
value in boosting aggregate liquidity. This implies that 
under certain circumstances,20 bubbles and investment 
can be complements, rather than substitutes as 
predicted by the competition effect. Furthermore, it 
can be shown that the existence of bubbles is a) more 
likely in economies with little pledgeable income, and 
b) consistent with dynamic efﬁ  ciency (the more so, 
the higher the agency costs in borrowing).
The burst of a bubble in this context may not be good 
news: it destroys a store of value and thereby creates a 
shortage of liquidity, resulting in lower investment.
2|4 The  subprime  crisis
While it is too early to provide an accurate account 
of the recent events, a number of factors came into 
play in the real estate crisis. First, the Fed for a long 
while kept the cost of borrowing rather low, resulting 
in high demand for and price of real estate. Second, 
credit was extended under rather risky terms: high 
loan-to-value ratios, backloading of reimbursements 
(teaser rates), low penalties, indexed mortgages.
Third, rating agencies underperformed, giving triple A
ratings to rather risky portfolios. Commentators have 
pointed at several deﬁ  ciencies of the rating process: 
weakness of models and assumptions on correlations, 
poor understanding of solvency of issuers and 
guarantors, ﬂ   ight of key personnel from rating 
agencies,21 conﬂ  icts of interest (repeated relationship 
between investment banks-whose involvement in 
structured ﬁ  nance has become substantial- and rating 
agencies, bundling of services by rating agencies), etc. 
Whatever the cause, a key step in the transformation 
of dead capital into liquidity failed. Ultimate buyers 
felt unable to assess the value of CDOs and CLOs and 
relied on the rating agencies’ certiﬁ  cation, but did 
not receive an accurate picture of those values.
A modest reduction of real estate prices (3.4% in 
a year) started creating threats of defaults of, or 
trouble for those institutions that had purchased 
portfolios of mortgage-backed securities, or had 
extended complex, and often hidden liabilities to 
structured investment vehicles. With it came the 
prospect of contagion, the stalling of markets and the 
worry about ﬁ  re sales, making prudential regulators 
concerned about banks, insurance companies and 
pension funds with exposures to MBSs.
The recent events have many ingredients of a 
standard liquidity crisis. The downturn of the real 
estate market created the initial aggregate liquidity 
shock. This shock was magniﬁ   ed by adverse 
selection, as portfolios became riskier and concerns 
about quality more pungent. Finally, the shock was 
further compounded by concerns about ﬁ  re sales.
3| PUBLIC SUPPLY OF LIQUIDITY
We earlier argued that the State can provide 
(outside) liquidity by using the future tax income 
to back up the reimbursements. In our stylized 
example for instance, the State can issue bonds at 
date 0 and promise to pay out at date 1.22 There 
are of course limits on what the State can do: ﬁ  rst, 
the reimbursement through taxation introduces 
both substantial deadweight losses and credibility 
problems when national debt reaches high levels. 
19 See  Tirole  (1985).
20 See  Farhi-Tirole  (2008).
21  Hired by investment banks to ﬁ  nd out modeling weaknesses.
22 Or  date  2 for that matter.ARTICLES
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Second, the taxation of consumers generates social 
costs when consumers have liquidity needs of their 
own. In particular, as employees of the ﬁ  rms, they 
may face hardships precisely when ﬁ  rms are in need 
of liquidity.
The fundamental feature of public provision of liquidity 
is that the State should redistribute from consumers 
to corporations when the latter face pressing liquidity 
needs. We have argued that this is what it does in 
practice, through a variety of instruments from open 
market operations to the discount window, from 
banking bailouts to non-indexed payroll taxes and 
deposit insurance premia. Ideally, the State should be 
issuing “state-contingent liquidity”, i.e. liquidity that 
delivers only during recessions. Contingent claims 
of this kind are usually implicit rather than explicit; 
an exception is the sale by the Federal Reserve of 
contingent access to the discount window in the 
context of the potential Y2K computer bug; in this 
case, a well-deﬁ  ned event of liquidity shortage (the 
potential problems with computers at the turn of the 
millennium) was identiﬁ  ed and contingent claims 
accordingly issued by the central bank. But deﬁ  ning 
precisely a liquidity shortage in advance is rather 
hard and injections of liquidity remain for that reason 
by and large discretionary.
Another suggestion of economic theory is that 
liquidity premia attached to risk-free rate assets 
are signals of the scarcity of aggregate liquidity at 
the various maturities and therefore are a useful 
guide for the issuing of government securities, both 
in level (total public debt) and in structure (choice 
of maturities); for example, a very low long rate 
signals substantial shortages of long-term stores of 
value, and therefore social gains to issuing long-term 
Treasury securities. A case in point is the issuing by 
HM Treasury of long-term bonds in reaction to the 
low rates triggered by the 2005 reform of pension 
funds requirements in the United Kingdom.
Another form of public intervention consists in 
preventing ﬁ  re sales by the corporate sector under 
severe strains in their liquidity position. While 
economists generally abhor such cartelization 
activities in general (and rightly so), a case can be 
made that sellers of assets “over-compete” in periods 
of liquidity shortages. Namely, the demand curve 
for these assets (industrial assets or real estate) isn’t 
perfectly elastic. Large sales may lead the price of 
these assets to plummet, reducing the liquidity 
available to the corporate sector in bad times.   
Orderly sales controlled or tolerated by authorities 
prevent too sharp a drop in the price of the assets; 
an alternative to avoiding ﬁ  re sales prices is to offer 
short-term loans to potential sellers of assets, as in 
the case of the planned superfund in the US, meant 
to prevent structure investment vehicles from 
engaging in ﬁ  re sales.
A public provision of liquidity may also buy the 
time needed to proceed to an orderly reallocation of 
liquidity. Recall that the asymmetry of information 
about assets increases during recessions. By injecting 
liquidity, the State may then be able to buy time for 
the owners of these assets if the latter can use this 
extra time to convince potential buyers of the assets 
of their quality.
Finally, we have taken a very normative approach. 
While the existence of liquidity shortages vindicates 
the injection of liquidity by the State, there remains 
a concern that the latter might inject too much 
liquidity, for several reasons. One, as usual, is 
capture by those who beneﬁ  t from an injection at 
the expense of taxpayers; relatedly, boosting the 
economy temporarily at a delayed and yet invisible 
cost may prove tempting. Second, the  State, 
regardless of its benevolence, may be subject 
to time inconsistency: it may bail out ﬁ  nancial 
institutions who have not properly managed their 
risk, generating ex ante moral hazard.23 Some of 
the many tools of aggregate liquidity management 
(e.g. bailouts) are more prone to generate moral 
hazard than others. Future research ought to 
provide a better picture of public policy, both in 
level and in structure.
23  See Rochet-Tirole (1996) for a model depicting simultaneously corporate liquidity management and the “soft budget constraint”.ARTICLES
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